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COMMENTARIES
Where I–O Psychology Should Really
(Re)start Its Investigation of Intelligence
Constructs and Their Measurement
FILIP LIEVENS
Ghent University
CHARLIE L. REEVE
University of North Carolina Charlotte
We believe that Scherbaum, Goldstein,
Yusko, Ryan, and Hanges (2012) come up
short in (a) their portrayal of the current
understanding of the nature of intelligence
as it exists in the science of mental abilities
and (b) their treatment of the measurement
of intelligence constructs. We argue that
their view on the nature of intelligence
is outdated and that measuring constructs
within the domain of intelligence should not
be equated only with the use of traditional
cognitive ability tests as alternative work-
based measures of intelligence constructs
have emerged and are in dire need of
empirical scrutiny.
An Updated View of ‘‘Intelligence’’
Scherbaum et al. appear to equate the
terms ‘‘intelligence’’ and ‘‘g,’’ and then
argue that this perspective is too limited.
If one equates ‘‘intelligence’’ with ‘‘g,’’
we would agree. However, this strikes
us as an outdated view. We would
encourage industrial–organizational (I–O)
psychologists to adopt a more up to date
understanding of intelligence so as to better
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understand where to focus research efforts.
As a first step, it is critical to understand
that ‘‘intelligence’’ is not a single construct;
rather, it is a generic term that refers to a
nomological network of different constructs
such as cognitive abilities, cognitive skills,
and acculturated knowledge (Gottfredson,
2009; Reeve & Bonaccio, 2011). From a
scientific perspective, then, it is more useful
to study the nature and structure of specific
constructs within this network.
There are two major components of
intelligence, which are distinguishable and
amenable to precise operational or empir-
ical descriptions (see Jensen, 1998; Reeve
& Bonaccio, 2011): (a) the ability to learn
new things and solve novel problems
(i.e., intelligence-as-process, mental abili-
ties, and fluid intelligence) and (b) the out-
comes of learning, namely the achievement
of acquired knowledge and skills, which are
dependent on prior experiencewithin a spe-
cific cultural context (i.e., intelligence-as-
knowledge, developed intellect, and crys-
tallized intelligence). Whereas the former
denotes general capacities for learning and
solving novel problems, the latter category
refers to the acquired information and skills
that can be drawn on for use in domain-
specific situations and can be improved by
instruction, practice, or manipulation.
This distinction between intelligence-as-
knowledge and intelligence-as-process is
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particularly useful for understanding some
of the apparent discrepancy in definitions
of intelligence. For example, contextual-
ists have argued that the set of acquired
skills and knowledge that are of greatest
relevance to success in a specific situation
should be considered to be the essence
of intelligence. These types of domain-
specific ‘‘hot intelligences,’’ as they have
been called, focus on the outcome of
learning from experience (i.e., intelligence-
as-knowledge). In contrast, psychometric
conceptualizations have tended to focus
on the broad, cross-situational behavioral
capacities (i.e., abilities) to acquire knowl-
edge and skills. There is nothing inconsis-
tent about these approaches to the study
of ‘‘intelligence’’; basic abilities give rise
to individual differences in the capacity
to acquire domain-specific knowledge and
skills from experience. Although these two
approaches have tended to focus on dif-
ferent constructs within the intelligence
network, one should not mistake them for
competing approaches. Indeed, the Cattel-
lian theory of fluid (Gf) and crystallized (Gc)
intelligence was advanced on the premise
that it provides a meaningful framework for
integrating the psychometric models with
developmental and process theories. Ack-
erman’s (1996) ‘‘intelligence-as-process,
personality, interests, and intelligence-as-
knowledge’’ (PPIK) theory stands as a prime
example of the potential natural synergy
between these approaches and one that
gives rise to a more complete understanding
of ‘‘intelligence’’ and of its connections to
other individual difference domains.
Clearly, our summary here cannot due
the topic justice (see, e.g., Reeve & Bonac-
cio, 2011, for a full review). Our main
point—alluded to by Scherbaum et al.—is
that the typical treatment of the domain
of intelligence in I–O psychology journals
lags behind the science of mental abilities.
If I–O psychologists are to reengage this
domain, we believe it would behoove them
to start with a more updated view. Simi-
larly, we caution I–O psychologists against
giving new names to existing constructs or
applying existing terms to different concepts
under the guise of innovation.
Reconnecting With the Science
of Mental Abilities: Toward a
Research Agenda
With this admittedly extremely brief clari-
fication, we turn to the issue of outlining
key areas ripe for discovery as well as areas
unlikely to be productive. First, it is safe
to conclude that a comprehensive picture
of the psychometric structure of cognitive
abilities has been established. Most experts
today accept some form of a hierarchal
model, with a single general cognitive abil-
ity factor at the apex (referred to as ‘‘g’’
or ‘‘general mental ability’’) in large part
due to the exhaustive work of John Carroll
(1993). Below this general factor, there are
a small number of specific abilities; and
each of these abilities, in turn, subsumes a
large number of task-specific skills reflecting
the effects of experience and learning (Car-
roll, 1993, pp. 633–634). Debate regarding
the remaining distinctions among models
is likely to be perceived by those outside
the field largely as ‘‘narcissisms of subtle
difference’’ (Lubinski, 2000, p. 7).
Second, a wide array of psychometric,
biological, and behavioral genetic evidence
has shown that mental abilities are not
just statistical artifacts and that they have
a significant and meaningful influence
on important real-world outcomes (e.g.,
Deary, 2009; Jensen, 1998; Lubinski, 2004).
Similarly, the nature of ‘‘g’’ is well known.
The g factor that underlies human mental
functioning is formally defined as the
‘‘eduction of relations and correlates’’
(Jensen, 1998); that is, the ability to infer or
deduce meaningful principles and concepts
from abstractness and from novel situations.
Research on its biological and neurological
basis confirms that it reflects something
‘‘real’’ (in a physical sense) about the brain.
For example, g scores correlate with brain
size and volume, complexity of average
evoked potentials, and nerve conduction
velocity (see Haier, 2009).
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We see three issues that are ripe for
significant progress (see also Reeve &
Bonaccio, 2011). First is the consideration
of the scientific significance of lower
order dimensions of human abilities (those
beyond g) and how best to appraise their
scientific worth (see Lubinski, 2000). There
is no question that individual differences
in g are important. Yet, recent work
confirms that specific abilities can be of
importance in addition to ‘‘g’’ (e.g., Park,
Lubinski, & Benbow, 2008; Reeve, 2004).
However, we caution against adopting the
‘‘horse race’’ mentality seen in the past.
Indeed, the value of specific abilities or
skills can be demonstrated without futile
attempts to discredit g. The work of
Lubinski and colleagues (e.g., Park et al.,
2008) concerning the importance of specific
abilities among high-g populations is a
salient example of how both g and narrow
abilities function in tandem.
Second is the further development of the
vertical and horizontal aspects of the g
network (‘‘g-nexus,’’ Jensen, 1998; Lubin-
ski, 2000). The vertical aspects seek to
uncover more fundamental (i.e., biologi-
cal and neurological) bases for g and to
develop more ultimate (i.e., evolutionary)
explanations (e.g., Deary, 2009). In addition
to the value for basic science, such work has
practical applications in the understanding
of group differences on manifest indicators
and the development of alternative mea-
sures of ‘‘g’’ (e.g., Jensen, 2006). The hori-
zontal aspect seeks to better understand the
practical significance of g via the breadth
of its associations with an array of social,
psychological, and health-related variables.
The potential value and importance of this
line of investigation have recently been real-
ized with the emergence of the field of
cognitive epidemiology (Deary, 2009). I–O
psychologists interested in organizational
attitudes and occupational health would be
well advised to be aware of this literature.
Third is the further refinement of ‘‘meta-
theories’’ that account for the interplay
between the three broad domains of indi-
vidual differences (intelligence, personality,
and conative factors) on one hand and
environmental affordances and demands in
the development of adult intellect on the
other. These more comprehensive mod-
els are likely not only to provide a more
complete understanding of the nature and
development of the nomological network of
intelligence but also to help reintegrate the
various domains of differential psychology.
Among these are three important examples
we believe to be themost well validated and
theoretically coherent (and hence, hope-
fully, the most influential): Snow’s (2002)
final work regarding a comprehensive the-
ory of aptitude, Ackerman’s (1996) PPIK
theory, and Chamorro-Premuzic and Furn-
ham’s (2005) emergingmodel of intellectual
competence. For example, a theory such
as PPIK provides a useful framework for
understanding how a common, universal
core of basic psychological characteristics
functions cross-culturally to give rise to cul-
turally differentiated and personally unique
adult intellects.
Limitations of the Traditional View
of Intelligence Measurement
Our second main issue with the lead article
is that the avenues for future research on
the measurement of ‘‘intelligence’’ focus
almost exclusively on the use of traditional
tests of ‘‘g’’ or broad abilities. This
focus implies that measures of constructs
within the intelligence network are equated
with standardized cognitive ability tests.
However, this view runs counter to not
just g-theory, which states that g is
‘‘indifferent to the indicator’’ (Jensen, 1998),
but more broadly, it also ignores the basic
premise of measurement theory. As Aftanas
(1988) succinctly explains, any mechanism,
process, or situation that is arranged to
denote (i.e., make manifest) a specific
construct can and should be viewed as
a standard system of measurement. The
key is to arrange the situation such that
behavior is predominantly a manifestation
of one (or a few) target construct(s). This
view, expressed in I–O psychology as the
distinction between constructs andmethods
(Arthur & Villado, 2008), makes clear that
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intelligence constructs can be assessed via
numerous approaches. For example, as
long as the system requires the eduction
of relations and correlates, or samples the
results of that ability (i.e., acquired skills), it
will measure ‘‘g’’ to some degree.
A second limitation is that traditional
ability tests as a measurement approach
are often criticized as ‘‘old-fashioned,’’
‘‘decontextualized,’’ and ‘‘restricted’’ (espe-
cially by managers), although there is still
widespread agreement on the importance of
the intelligence constructs themselves (e.g.,
inclusion of problem solving, analyzing,
decision-making, or the so-called intellec-
tual horsepower in competency models).
Thus, if we equate the measurement of
intelligence constructs with traditional stan-
dardized tests, we risk of further distancing
ourselves from how intelligence constructs
are assessed in practice (e.g., among man-
agers).
Work-Based Measurement of
Mental Abilities: Examples and a
Research Agenda
By disentangling constructs within the intel-
ligence network from the use of traditional
tests, it becomes clear that there are var-
ious potential standard systems of mea-
surement. In fact, several work-based and
contextualized measurement approaches
have already been originated. For instance,
Klingner and Schuler (2004) developed a
1-hour work sample for clerical positions in
which business-related material (commer-
cial texts, business facts, coworker names,
and balance values) had to be reviewed,
compared, sorted, corrected, memorized,
and recalled. The work sample correlated
highly with observed scores from standard
intelligence tests (corrected correlation of
.87), had higher predictive validity (for
supervisory ratings), and was seen as more
realistic and transparent. Additionally, exist-
ing selection procedures such as assessment
centers (Arthur, Day, McNelly, & Edens,
2003), situational judgment tests (Christian,
Edwards, & Bradley, 2010), and interviews
(Huffcutt, Conway, Roth, & Stone, 2001)AQ1
have already been shown to denote intelli-
gence constructs.
Another option is contextualized ability
tests. In educational psychology, there is
a tradition of assessing complex problem
solving via PC simulations (e.g., Program AQ2
for International Student Assessment Wirth
& Klieme, 2003). Similarly, in health
psychology and medicine, there is a
tradition of measuring basic abilities via
‘‘health literacy’’ tests (a combination of
contextualized cognitive ability items and
applied problem solving scenarios). Such
ideas have also been adapted to business
situations. For example, applicants might
be required to make inferences about a
series of business-related graphs or tables
(Hattrup, Schmitt, & Landis, 1992). Perhaps
in the future, serious games might enable
to assess adaptive problem solving in
simulated dynamic work situations.
We believe that a programmatic line of
research is needed in this domain of alterna-
tive measurement of intelligence constructs.
Hereby, we should not only focus on pre-
dictive validity and subgroup differences
but in particular on construct-related valid-
ity. Conceptually, it is important to exam-
ine whether alternative measures denote
cognitive dimensions highlighted in ‘‘meta-
theories’’ such as planning, attention, simul-
taneous, and successive theory (Naglieri &
Das, 2005) or PPIK (Ackerman, 1996). Lit-
tle research has also aimed to enhance
the alternative measurement of intelli-
gence constructs. For example, there is no
research on how to increase or decrease the
g loading of assessment exercises. At a prac-
tical level, we should investigate how the
alternative methods converge in measuring
the same cognitive dimensions. Similarly,
it is important to examine the overlap and
incremental value of these approaches to
traditional ability tests. Finally, we should
scrutinize the perceptions of these measures
among relevant stakeholders.
Conclusion
We agree with Scherbaum et al. to rein-
vigorate research on intelligence constructs
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and measurement but we differ in (a) where
the research on its nature should start
and (b) how the measurement of intelli-
gence should proceed. We recommend
that I–O psychology study the extant lit-
erature in the science of mental abilities
before starting such investigations. With
a renewed and updated understanding of
the theoretical nature of the nomological
network of intelligence, we further believe
that research into alternative work-oriented
measures of intelligence constructs consti-
tutes a tremendous opportunity to put intel-
ligence again on the research agenda of I–O
psychology.
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